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Abstract 
Globalisation has begun to transform the processes through which citizens are 
differentiated and non-citizens are excluded. This article provides an in-depth qualitative 
interrogation of these processes of differentiation and exclusion, and argues that the 
transformation in these processes compels us to reconsider the conceptual dichotomy of 
passive/active citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction. This transformation is most 
apparent in Europe, with the introduction of European Union (EU) citizenship. The 
article builds on Bourdieu’s cultural capital in the cosmopolitan context, existing 
qualitative studies on citizens’ sense of EU identity and citizenship, and illustrative focus 
group evidence of visiting EU and home students’ perceptions of EU citizenship across 
three dimensions – identity, rights and participation. The evidence indicates that we can 
distinguish between four categories of citizens in the EU: passive EU citizens, including 
two groups of stayers; the potential EU (i) and member state-oriented (ii) citizens, and 
active EU citizens, including EU-15 (iii) and CEE (iv) mobile citizens. These categories 
reveal that important distinctions are emerging between the perceptions and behaviour of 
stayers and mobiles as passive/active citizens. 
Keywords: active/passive citizens, EU citizenship, mobility, cultural capital, identity, 
differentiation/ exclusion   
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Introduction  
 Citizenship studies have recognised the transformations in the relationship 
between nation states, citizens and non-citizens (Isin and Turner 2002). Some of these 
transformations have been accounted for by globalisation
i
 and traced in new processes of 
differentiation and exclusion linked to citizens’ mobility status and economic and cultural 
capital (Skey 2011a, 122). These transformations are expected to be particularly evident in 
the European context (Beck 2006), in which the intensified level of regional integration has 
led to the introduction of European Union (EU) citizenship – the first direct link between a 
transnational political community (the EU) and the individuals (member state citizens). 
Although the political substance of EU citizenship remains questionable (Maas 2007), its 
impact on processes of exclusion and differentiation is undeniable (Hansen and Hager 2010). 
EU citizenship unites some citizens from the European continent, while excluding others. The 
differentiation between and among EU citizens – on the basis of their mobility status and 
country of origin – has also been particularly apparent, especially in the context of the recent 
crisis (Shaw 2012).  
 
Against this backdrop, the article provides an in-depth qualitative interrogation of 
processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU. Due to the role of mobility in activating 
EU citizenship however, it proposes that we reconsider the dichotomy of passive/active 
citizens – traditionally observed through citizens’ political engagement – along the 
stayers/mobiles distinction. Empirical studies provide some indication of the anticipated 
differences between the attitudes and behaviour of stayers and mobiles (see for example 
Favell 2008, 2010; Rother and Nebe 2009; Muxel 2009). However, they also draw attention 
to some inconsistencies, depending on country contexts and citizens’ political ideology, for 
example. This article will illustrate some of the inconsistencies involved with the proposition 
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of observing stayers/mobiles as active/passive (EU) citizens. It builds on the concept of 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) in the cosmopolitan context and existing qualitative studies 
on (young) citizens’ sense of EU citizenship and identity (Bruter 2005; Skey 2011a; Ross 
2014). It seeks to develop and complement these studies through the analysis of original 
focus group evidence of visiting EU and home students’ perceptions of EU citizenship across 
three dimensions – identity, rights and participation.ii 
 
The evidence was collected as part of a larger research project that probes the scope 
for the realisation of EU citizenship as envisaged by the European Commission and the 
processes by which young member state citizens actually realise their EU citizenship. Since 
the institutional framework of EU citizenship is built on citizens’ free movement rights, and 
these rights are contingent on their socio-economic background, including sufficient 
economic resources and educational attainment, it was assumed that these candidates would 
be the most likely to realise EU citizenship. Focus group research was conducted in Sweden, 
which is identified as an ideal setting for EU citizenship to materialise. Sweden has been the 
only member state to apply EU rules to all mobile EU citizens, including citizens from the 
2004 and 2007 Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states, and citizens from Croatia 
(joined in 2013). Hence it is the only country that can really illustrate the similarities and 
differences between different groups of mobiles, including CEE and Western European (EU-
15) citizens. Overall, the focus group evidence suggests that there are significant differences 
between the perceptions of passive (in this case ‘stayers’) and active EU citizens (in this case 
‘mobiles’). 
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 The article is structured as follows: the first section defines (EU) citizenship and 
sheds light on recent transformations in processes of differentiation and exclusion as a result 
of globalisation. The second section illustrates the conceptual dichotomy of passive/active 
citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction. The third section considers the research 
methods (focus group) and case study (Sweden) adopted. The fourth section explores visiting 
EU and home students’ perceptions of EU citizenship, and the final section draws 
conclusions with regard to contemporary processes of differentiation and exclusion among 
stayers and mobiles.  
 
Defining (EU) citizenship 
Citizenship is understood in this article as a dynamic link between a sovereign 
political community and the individuals (Isin and Turner 2002). It is a process of exclusion, 
dividing citizens from non-citizens and a process of differentiation, distinguishing between 
citizens from a political engagement perspective along the passive/active dichotomy (Turner 
1997, 15). Citizenship is expected to have a multidimensional character, involving three 
interrelated and collective dimensions – identity, rights and participation. A closer inspection 
of these dimensions can elucidate the ‘lived’ experiences related to a particular citizenship 
model (Heater 2004, 166). They will thus be considered in the analysis of focus group 
evidence in order to illustrate actual processes of differentiation and exclusion related to EU 
citizenship.  
 
The dimensions of citizenship are anticipated to manifest through different 
components. First, the identity of citizens entails a sense of belonging to the political 
community (Bellamy 2008) and a shared identity among citizens (Smith 1992, 58). For the 
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latter aspect to be consequential however, citizens must also be able to distinguish between 
their fellows and the “other”, non-citizens (Karolewski 2010, 26). Second, the rights of 
citizens define the formal rules of access to the political community and guarantee equal 
access among citizens to the community’s civil, social and political rights (Vink and Bauböck 
2013). Third, the participation of citizens elucidate who (socio-economic background), why 
(models of participation) and how (forms of engagement) takes part in political-decision 
making (Smets and van Ham 2013). Through these elements, the dimensions of citizenship 
can reveal the relationship between the political community and the citizens, the distribution 
of power among citizens and the distinction between citizens and non-citizens (Balibar 1988). 
They can thus be indicative of how different categories of citizens, in particular ‘passive’ and 
‘active’ citizens (are anticipated to) emerge and who the “other” is.  
 
In the national context, these categories have derived from an alleged balance 
between citizens’ rights and duties (Bellamy 2005, 157). More specifically, the focus has 
been on citizens’ access to political rights and political participation – usually in traditional 
forms of engagement (casting a vote or standing for elections). However, due to 
globalisation, we are now entering “a new era… in which national borders and differences 
are dissolving and must be renegotiated” (Beck 2006, 2). Globalisation is transforming 
processes of differentiation and exclusion as well (Skey 2013). For example, citizens have an 
increasingly unequal access to influencing political-decision making (Sloam 2013, 10-11). 
They have thus begun to participate in alternative forms of engagement (volunteering and 
protesting) to make an impact. Similarly, more and more states are introducing citizenship 
tests in order to keep the (unwanted) “other” out, and these developments effect the (strength) 
of citizens’ national and cosmopolitan identity (Bruter 2005). 
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The transformation in these processes is perhaps most apparent in Europe, where a 
transnational status – EU citizenship – has been ‘added’ to citizens’ existing national statuses. 
The novelty of EU citizenship does not only stem from its transnational scope however. The 
requirement for citizens to move (within) the EU in order to activate their EU-level rights is 
also important. In particular, this dependence on mobility indicates that EU citizenship has an 
economic and market-oriented character (Maas 2007). Indeed, official documents only detail 
the rights of mobile EU citizens (see for example European Commission 2013) and, despite 
their small number – 13.7 million in January 2013, totalling to just over three per cent of the 
population (Eurostat 2014) – citizens’ mobility is anticipated to benefit “the EU as a whole” 
(European Commission 2010, 2). Accordingly, mobility “fosters a sense of European identity 
[among citizens and] contributes to the internal market, as Europeans who are mobile as 
young learners are more likely to be mobile as workers later in life” (European Commission 
2010, 2). The recent reshuffling of the relevant commissioner’s portfolio that brought 
migration and citizenship together is an indication that the emphasis on the mobility of EU 
citizens is here to stay. Against this backdrop, the propensity of EU citizens to realise a 
political citizenship at the EU-level seems to have a marginal importance, making the 
dichotomy of passive/active citizens from the traditional political engagement perspective 
irrelevant. This article proposes that the focus should instead be on the differences between 
the perceptions and behaviour of stayers as passive and mobiles as active citizens.  
 
There is already some evidence to indicate that there are important disparities between 
EU citizens on the basis of their mobility status (European Commission 2013, 4) and between 
EU citizens and the “other”, the non-EU citizens, especially considering the rights of citizens 
compared to that of long-term, third-country residents in the EU (Hansen and Hager 2010, 
197-206). Empirical studies suggest that intra-EU mobility enhances the EU identity of 
  
7 
individuals, including non-citizens (Roeder 2011), and assist in managing the multiple layers 
(related to intersecting social factors, i.e. gender and age) and levels (related to the local, 
national, EU and cosmopolitan levels) of their identity (Rother and Nebe 2009, 153). Mobiles 
are more likely to be interested in EU politics than stayers (Muxel 2009, 159) and usually 
support the EU’s integration efforts through their participation in alternative forms of 
engagement (as conscious consumers or as advocates of a cosmopolitan culture) (Favell 
2010, 210). These findings thus support the proposition to reconsider the dichotomy of 
passive/ active citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction in the EU.  
 
Nonetheless, the same studies also reveal that there are inconsistencies in the 
perceptions and behaviour of stayers and mobiles. The actual (EU) identity of mobiles tends 
to vary substantially, according to country contexts (Favell 2008, 95), socio-economic factors 
(Fligstein 2008, 125) and educational attainment (Kuhn 2012, 999). There is also discrepancy 
in the political behaviour of mobiles, depending on country context, level of engagement and 
political ideologies (Muxel 2009, 160-170). Moreover, there is some indication of similarities 
between the attitudes of movers, including citizens and non-citizens towards the EU. 
However, the attitudes of stayers and mobiles vary considerably (even though these stayers 
are, formally at least, EU citizens) (Roeder 2011). These inconsistencies warrant for an in-
depth qualitative study on processes of differentiation and exclusion among stayers and 
mobiles in the EU context – a contribution this article seeks to make to the literature. 
Therefore, the next section of this article will attempt to ‘unpack’ the proposed 
stayers/mobiles distinction. To do so, the section will build on Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of 
cultural capital and existing qualitative research on (young) citizens’ sense of EU identity and 
citizenship (Bruter 2005; Skey 2011a; Ross 2014). 
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Active citizenship through mobility 
The concept of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) can be useful as an empirical 
indicator of and basis for processes of differentiation and exclusion. It is understood in this 
article as “institutionalized, i.e. widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, 
preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural 
exclusion” (Lamont and Lareau 1988, 156). Accordingly, cultural capital is used by “the 
best” (the dominant group) to indicate cultural distinction and proximity from “the masses” 
(dominated groups) (Bourdieu 1984, 31). This is done through monopolising privileges and 
excluding, differentiating and enlisting members (Lamont and Lareau 1988, 158). Cultural 
capital can manifest in three interrelated forms (Bourdieu 1984, 479-81). The embodied form 
(individual dispositions and competences) provides privileged access to the objectified form 
(goods such as books or paintings). The objectified form is then institutionalised according to 
specific cultural appraisals (most importantly, educational qualifications). The 
institutionalised form in turn privileges its holders over others. Due to the variety in its forms, 
cultural capital leads to diverse processes of differentiation and exclusion, such as self-
elimination or relegation (Lamont and Lareau 1988, 158-9).  
 
Consequently, the concept of cultural capital has been adopted to illustrate and 
explain various processes of differentiation and exclusion. In the national context, cultural 
capital has been used to explore debates about how, whether and why certain people are 
noticed as and ‘made to feel’ ‘more or less national’ (Hage 1998). For example, a recent 
empirical investigation found that notwithstanding the effects of globalisation, the national 
framework shapes the identity of those citizens who make up the dominant group within a 
nation state (Skey 2011a, 148). The evidence indicates that the national framework is often 
“taken-for-granted” by this group (Skey 2011b, 245) and leads to the favouring of certain 
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“physical features, characteristics, abilities and forms of knowledge” (Skey 2011a, 155). This 
approach in turn secures the privileged position of the group. Cultural capital has also been 
considered in the cosmopolitan context, where it is linked to the struggle “for privileged 
positions that require competencies to effectively interact with people of multiple 
nationalities” (Weenink 2008, 1092). The emphasis is on the (perceived) importance of 
increased geographical mobility, consumption of foreign cultural products and expression of 
a cosmopolitan outlook. The latter is expected to be apparent in peoples’ dispositions 
towards, competencies for and actual engagement with ‘the Other’ (Igarashi and Saito 2014, 
4).
iii
  
 
However, the extent to which people can actually adopt a cosmopolitan outlook 
depends on the frequency and type of their mobility, and the different contextual pressures 
they are exposed to during their mobility, including country of origin and socio-economic 
factors. Accordingly, people from the Western and Northern parts of the world are 
encouraged to move frequently and adopt “a sense of natural cosmopolitanism”, while those 
from the East and South are reminded of their nationality and ethnic background, and their 
international movement is curbed substantially (Calhoun 2003, 543). Further distinctions may 
also be drawn between the attitudes of ‘cosmopolitan travellers’ and ‘parochial tourists’. A 
genuine cosmopolitan outlook is anticipated to manifest among ‘cosmopolitan travellers’ to 
whom “the stereotype of the parochial tourist serves as a proscriptive image of how not to 
experience different cultures when travelling” (Thompson and Tambyah 1999, 216). 
Globalisation has also affected stayers, who are expected to develop a cosmopolitan outlook 
through different forms of ‘internationalisation at home’. Most stayers are exposed to ‘global 
images’ presented in the mass media (Urry 2002, 6) and an increasing number interact with 
mobiles or exercise temporary cross-border mobility (Skey 2011b). However, their 
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cosmopolitan outlook remains to be “fragile” and likely to underscore the on-going 
significance of national frameworks (Skey 2013, 238-40). 
 
The effects of globalisation are the most apparent in Europe and, in particular, in the 
EU (Beck 2006). Notwithstanding the important distinctions between mobiles (Shaw 2012), 
recent empirical studies (Bruter 2005; Skey 2011; Ross 2014) have already underscored that 
mobiles are the EU’s ‘Eurostars’ (Favell 2008). They possess an increased sense of (civic) 
EU identity and are more open towards the “other” from EU states. Although most of these 
studies rely on qualitative evidence with stayers (the exception is Favell 2008, 2010), they 
have already begun to ‘unpack’ the distinctions between stayers and mobiles. They can thus 
offer more conceptual insight into how (EU) citizens’ perceptions and behaviour are likely to 
transform as a result of their mobility and/or greater exposure to mobility. 
 
Michael Bruter (2005, 6 emphasis in original) explored citizens’ perceptions of 
EU/European identity in three countries (France, the UK, and the Netherlands) in order “to 
understand how EU citizens feel”. His evidence indicates that “a mass European identity has 
progressively emerged … and continues to grow, and has already achieved high enough 
levels not to be ignored by academic commentators” (Bruter 2005, 166). It also supports the 
proposition that political institutions and the media have played an important role in 
developing citizens’ EU identity (Bruter 2005, 123-133).  Most importantly perhaps, Bruter’s 
(2004, 26) analysis distinguishes between two aspects of citizens’ political identity. First, a 
cultural component refers to citizens’ sense of belonging to the European continent, shaped 
by cultural, social and ethnic similarities. Second, a civic component manifests through 
citizens’ identification with the EU’s political structures, including its institutions, rights and 
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rules. The evidence indicates that the civic component of citizens’ identity – their recognition 
of the EU as a source of their mobility rights and cosmopolitan identity – can really explain 
how EU citizens feel (Bruter 2004, 34-35). In this context, the changing borders of the EU 
(both internally and externally) impacts the strength of citizens’ emerging EU identity 
significantly (Bruter 2005, 159). Overall, Bruter’s (2004, 36) findings underscore the 
“predominantly positive” character of citizens’ EU/European identity. 
 
Alistair Ross (2014) investigated how young people (aged 11 to 19) construct their 
identity in ‘New Europe’ – in countries, which have recently joined or are about to join the 
EU. His evidence reveals that young peoples’ identity is kaleidoscopic and context-
contingent. It “change[s] as one looks through a lens, possibly through a filter” because 
young people use “a palette of materials” (Ross 2014, 183) to construct their identity, 
including socio-economic factors, age, nationality and ethnicity. Ross’s (2012a, 96, 2012b, 
41) findings suggest that there is a basic distinction between young peoples’ cultural 
(national) and civic (EU) identities, though their approaches to these identities may vary. For 
example, young people were critical about the civic component of their national identity at 
the outset of the discussions. However, the significance of this component was enhanced 
when they spoke of countries with (allegedly) lesser democratic structures (e.g. Russia) (Ross 
2014, 163-173). Similarly, the cultural component of their EU identity was accentuated when 
young people compared their EU and national identities with that of their parents (Ross 2014, 
188). By distinguishing themselves from older generations, their discussions highlighted the 
existence of ‘internal others’ within the EU (Ross 2014, 119). These findings thus underscore 
the “momentary, situational [and] observer-dependent” character of young peoples’ identity 
(Ross 2014, 184). 
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Michael Skey (2011a) provides some innovative insight into how members of the 
ethnic majority and dominant group in England interact with ‘the Other’. His evidence 
suggests that these citizens recognise the cosmopolitan outlook as desirable (Skey 2012, 482) 
and, as a result, often “present a rational and enlightened self-image” (Skey 2011a, 131). 
However, there is likely to be inconsistency in citizens’ actual engagement with ‘the Other’. 
While the majority of his participants seemed eager to travel abroad and become acquainted 
with different cultures, they only engaged with ‘the Other’ in those circumstances that did not 
have a personal relevance or did not challenge their national identity (Skey 2012, 483). In the 
latter circumstances citizens safeguarded their status as “Western citizens, able to wield a 
privileged passport and to expect the support of powerful institutional authorities” (Skey 
2011b, 248). Their approach accentuated the significance of the national framework, the 
values they carried as a privileged group and the “temporal, conditional and often fragile” 
character of their actual cosmopolitan outlook (Skey 2011a, 8).  
 
In order to shed light on the likely dichotomy of passive/active citizens along the 
proposed stayers/mobiles distinction, Table 1 summarises the issues raised in this section of 
the article. It suggests observing passive citizens as stayers – their dispositions towards, 
competencies for and actual engagement with ‘the Other’ is likely to be limited in the 
everyday context. In comparison, it proposes recognising active citizens as mobiles – they 
have the opportunity to actually engage with ‘the Other’ on a daily basis. However, their 
engagement with ‘the Other’ is likely to accentuate the presumed differences between various 
peoples and cultures, and their national identity is expected to have a central stage in making 
sense of these differences. Furthermore, because these differences are mostly noticeable 
through mobility, mobility may be used as a point of reference that distinguishes mobiles 
from stayers and vice versa. Therefore, a real cosmopolitan outlook (through the cultural 
  
13 
component of mobiles’ EU identity for example) is not expected to develop among either 
group. 
 
<< Table 1 about here>> 
Table 1: Categories of citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction 
 
Research Methods 
 To illustrate processes of differentiation and exclusion, this article includes an 
analysis of original focus group evidence. There are two main reasons for selecting focus 
groups as the research method for this article. First, focus groups are particularly suitable for 
carrying out exploratory research in a sensitive field of study (Morgan 1998, 11). Considering 
that citizenship and identity are issues that students are unlikely to discuss on an everyday 
basis, making sense of their perceptions would have been difficult using survey or interview 
data. Focus groups are thus observed as a more appropriate research method. They allow for 
the expression of diverse views and facilitate interaction and collective sense making among 
participants (Bryman 2012, 503-504). Second, the interaction, reasoning and forms of 
reflection present in the focus groups are expected to provide a more in-depth data. Students 
can go beyond a set of interview questions and probe one another for holding certain 
perspectives. The resulting interaction among them is expected to highlight the issue they 
consider important and produce insights that would be harder to access using a different 
research method (Morgan 1998, 12).  
 
 The focus groups referred to in this article were collected as part of a larger 
research project, which investigates the opportunities of and actual ways in which citizens 
  
14 
realise EU citizenship. In particular, this article includes a study of a sub-group of young, 
highly educated and mobile EU citizens in Sweden. While the exploratory evidence is not 
representative of the general population, it is expected to shed light on the likely impact 
mobility has on those citizens who are susceptible to changes in their perceptions of 
citizenship. Five semi-structured focus groups with visiting EU and home students were 
collected by the author between April and May 2012.
iv
 Four focus groups were carried out 
with 22 visiting EU students, including exchange, Erasmus and full time students. The seven 
home students who participated in the fifth group were in full-time education. This group is 
used as a control in the analysis to which visiting EU students’ responses are compared. All 
students were recruited through snowballing technique and visiting EU students were 
required to have come to Sweden as a result of their EU citizenship. They came from a 
variety of EU member states, including Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom. At the time of the 
interviews students were aged between 18 to 30 years (their average age was 23.5 years) and 
visiting EU students had previously stayed in Sweden between 2 weeks and 3.5 years (their 
average length of stay was 14 months).  
 
 The reasons for selecting Sweden as the case study for this exploratory research 
are two-fold. One the one hand, the Swedish context is expected to be ideal for novel 
citizenships – like EU citizenship – to thrive. This is partly the result of the lack of a clear 
legal definition of Swedish citizenship, which has confused Swedes about what citizenship 
signifies. For instance, they often believe that citizens should be able to enjoy the benefits of 
the Swedish welfare state whilst residing abroad (Bernitz 2012, 17). Instead of Swedish 
citizenship per se, the emphasis has been on promoting social principles of ‘neutrality’ and 
communitarianism (Agius 2006, 588) – apparent in Sweden’s open-door migration policy 
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(discussed below). The Swedish educational system is expected to promote these principles 
further and has already been found to have led to particularly high levels of cognitive 
mobilisation – a process through which the political recourses and skills of individuals are 
enhanced – among Swedes (Welzel and Inglehart 2010, 55).  
 
 On the other hand, Sweden has been the only EU-15 state to open its borders, 
labour market and social welfare provisions to citizens from CEE and EU-15 states. As a 
result, it registered around 282,000 mobile EU citizens in 2013 (Eurostat 2014) and a 
growing number of mobile EU citizens in the recent years, from about 16,500 in 2004 to 
25,300 in 2012 (Eurostat 2014). Interestingly, almost half of all mobile EU citizens who 
arrived to Sweden in 2012 (10,500 citizens) were visiting students (SHEA 2013). Hence 
Sweden seemingly imitates, to some extent at least, a fully integrated Union. It can thus 
demonstrate the likely effects citizens’ country of origin (EU-15 or CEE) has on EU 
citizenship. Nevertheless, it must be noted that compared to other EU countries, Sweden has 
had one of the lowest shares of mobile EU citizens and visiting EU students. This is due to its 
stiff labour market conditions and language requirements (Wadensjö 2007). Therefore, 
integrating into the Swedish educational market and society can pose practical challenges to 
visiting EU students, which might influence their perceptions of EU citizenship. 
 
Empirical observations from visiting EU and home students 
 In order to provide an in-depth qualitative interrogation of processes of 
differentiation and exclusion, this section includes an analysis of original focus group 
evidence, exploring students’ perceptions of EU citizenship and investigating the differences 
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and similarities in their EU identity, assessment of EU rights and actual political 
participation.  
 
EU citizenship 
 Visiting EU and home students were enthusiastic about the opportunity to discuss 
EU citizenship, but adopted quite different approaches to making sense of it. Nearly all 
visiting EU students used personal examples: “[I]f you speak about European citizenship, I 
never felt so European than this year as an Erasmus student” (French Male, EU Group 3). 
They were also more inclined to expand on the potentials and limits of (civic) EU citizenship 
and what it meant for them personally.  
Italian Male, EU Group 1: It means an extra feature of citizenship… It's much more 
convenient to be a European citizen just because [of the] passport of the European Union.  
French, Male: It's still only a limited citizenship. Okay, we’re granted rights and we're 
travelling, most of us [are] and only [have] one electoral right every five years to vote for 
the Parliament. But in that election we don't really participate to the combination or 
appointment of our executive. … We still have no real control over them! So it's still 
really a limited citizenship. Yeah. I think it's under-construction. 
 
 The majority of home students gave more objective descriptions and observed EU 
citizenship as an important extension of their national (cultural) status. As a result, they did 
not spend much time on discussing the personal significance of EU citizenship. “We have 
extended our rights outside the national borders and it means that it should be easy to live in 
another European country the same way that you live in your own country. ... And therefore 
we are now European citizens” (Swedish Female (2), Control Group). Home students also 
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had a tendency to focus on the significance of post-national values, duties, rights and welfare 
benefits in the EU (echoing their approach to Swedish citizenship). Furthermore, two home 
students openly admitted that they had never heard of EU citizenship before taking part in the 
research or prior to their university studies.  
Swedish Female (1), Control Group: I heard it for the first time in our political theory 
course when we were talking about citizenship. I've never come [into] contact with the 
concept [of] ‘European citizen’ [before] and I find it surprising because I consider myself 
being, well, at least not ignorant. 
 
 Therefore, the initial discussions highlighted the usefulness of analysing EU and 
national citizenships along the civic/cultural divide (Bruter 2005; Ross 2014), and mirrored 
the expected distinctions between visiting EU and home students. 
 
EU identity 
 In order to explore what students actually meant by “being EU citizens”, they 
were directly probed about the three dimensions of EU citizenship. While every group had 
identified two dimensions of EU citizenship (EU identity and rights) during the initial 
discussions, only two students in EU Group 1 made a few sceptical comments about the 
significance of citizens’ EU-level participation (cited earlier).  
 
 In the ensuing debates students considered the different contexts and “many 
levels in which you can consider yourself a European” at length. They also mentioned that 
heightened exposure to different EU symbols, including the Euro, and, particularly, the 
European Health Care Card, and previous experiences of movement strengthened “feeling 
  
18 
European” (a reference to Bruter’s (2005) indicator). The different elements of identity shed 
further light on students’ actual EU identity and the shape contemporary processes of 
differentiation and exclusion have taken in the EU. The majority of visiting EU and home 
students had similar approaches to understanding their sense of belonging to the EU and 
excluding the “other”. For instance, they all agreed that their “special [legal] status” and 
previous experiences of external migration were helpful in distinguishing between EU 
citizens and the “other”. It also seemed to have made “being European” more pronounced.  
Portuguese Male, EU Group 2: I think it would stand out more if we travel[led] together 
with our friends to Africa or to Asia. And they will say ‘You know, those are the 
Europeans. Just talk to them!’ Because when you are outside your area where you live, 
you are [different]. 
While nearly every student appeared to be open to identifying as Europeans or as EU citizens, 
none of them considered actually introducing themselves in these terms. “I would like to call 
it [EU citizenship] but I think it's too early to do so. I think people are not ready for that” 
(Lithuanian Male, EU Group 3). Nonetheless, all groups adopted a “predominantly positive” 
(Bruter 2004, 36) and expectant attitude towards EU citizenship and anticipated that it will 
mean “something in the near future”.  
 
 As the discussions progressed however, important differences between visiting 
EU and home students’ approaches to a shared EU identity emerged. Specifically, intra-EU 
mobility and engagement with fellow EU mobiles led to differentiation between EU mobiles 
and stayers. Visiting EU students felt that their familiarity with EU citizenship was the most 
important aspect of their shared EU identity, probing the real depth of stayers’ EU identity. 
“[S]ince we can move it starts to be relevant to be European. But that's the problem I think, 
not for us, but for people that don't move. Why should they feel European?” (French Male, 
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EU Group 1). The resulting divide between stayers and mobiles seemed to further boost the 
shared EU identity among visiting EU students. 
British-Hungarian Male, EU Group 2: [I]t's like when you are here, when you are out 
with your friends and you feel like it's an international community of Europeans. ... We 
are Europeans but noone kind of says it. It's just in the air. You feel it. … 
German, Female: Yeah… it's really difficult to integrate yourself into the Swedish 
community and you sort of stay out. ... And maybe that actually goes in the other 
direction; that we feel more European because we are in this international community. 
Stayers were then referred to as “they” and were categorised as ‘internal (EU) others’. 
 
 In comparison, most home students considered shared EU identity “as part of 
Swedish identity” and expected it to manifest in relation to certain values, including “peace” 
and “democracy”. Nonetheless, the majority of home students did not identify collectively as 
EU citizens and stated that they had “never come across [anyone saying] that we were 
Europeans instead of Swedish”. Even in the very few occasions when home students made 
individual references to a sense of EU identity, they excluded visiting EU students from this 
group, who were seen as “different from Swedes”. Home students’ approaches thus highlight 
the limited impact increased mobility and EU integration (possible forms of 
‘internationalisation at home’) had on their engagement with the “other”, the non-Swedish 
citizens. 
 
 Therefore, the kaleidoscopic character (Ross 2014) of students’ identity seemed 
to have been reconfigured by their exposure to EU symbols and actual experiences of 
different forms of movement, including mobility and migration. These reconfigurations led to 
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a positive sense of belonging to the EU, a shared EU identity (among stayers and mobiles 
respectively) and the recognition of the “other” and ‘internal others’. 
 
EU rights 
 Intra-EU mobility as a form of cultural capital was perhaps most apparent 
throughout students’ debates about their EU rights. Indeed, most asserted that EU citizenship 
was only relevant to a minority of the EU’s population – those who moved (within or outside 
the EU): “I think we just experience the fact of European citizenship when we go abroad, as 
we are now. But in our country, I think, we never think ‘Okay I have European rights’, only 
our national rights” (French Male, EU Group 4). Thus EU citizenship was not perceived as a 
political construct but as something more liberal, “a kind of citizenship that belongs to 
rights”.  
 
 Due to the economic and educational prerequisites of mobility however, students 
observed EU citizenship as an “elitist community” that is not relevant to the ‘regular’ 
member state citizens. Quite a few students also emphasised that these prerequisites 
differentiated not only between mobile EU citizens and stayers but also among stayers. 
Potential EU citizens with the economic and educational means to move at some point in 
their lives were separated from member state-oriented citizens, who cannot afford to move. 
The latter group was believed to be the largest segment of the EU’s population.  
French Male, EU Group 1: [EU citizenship] is like an extra-upper institution that they 
[stayers] don't really understand and I think it will create very soon a gap between like 
cosmopolitan citizens … and national citizens [who] can't be anything but national 
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citizens… [They] won't be able to travel or to meet the other people of the world or 
Europe … [and they] will close [up between] themselves. 
 
 Furthermore, most visiting CEE and some EU-15 students indicated that the 
rights of mobile CEE citizens were significantly restricted by member states policies and 
national stereotypes.  
Bulgarian Female (1), EU Group 4: To some extent I feel that I am discriminated even if 
I go as a European citizen... because, [coming from] the new EU countries, people all 
expect that we are beggars and everything bad and negative… [W]e are not even given 
the chance to show who we are! 
Students then distinguished between two categories of mobile EU citizens: EU-15 and CEE 
citizens. Unlike the distinction between mobiles and stayers however, students anticipated the 
differences among mobiles to phase out. The Swedish context with its emphasis on 
communitarian principles and persistent open-door immigration policies may explain their 
expectant tone. 
 
 Therefore, students identified different categories of stayers and mobiles 
according to factors that were expected to significantly affect citizens’ ability to move freely 
within the EU. These factors include country of origin, economic resources and educational 
backgrounds.  
 
EU participation 
 Although a number of opportunities were given to students to discuss their 
participation in traditional and alternative forms of engagement in EU, national and local 
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politics – not to mention that most of them were studying politics at a university at the time of 
the research – they did not speak about this issue until the moderator probed them directly. In 
response, most students clarified that their participation was issue-specific and had a personal 
connotation. Their responses thus collaborate existing research about the changes in citizens’ 
actual political participation (Favell 2010; Sloam 2013).  
 
 Moreover, differences between visiting EU and home students’ approaches to 
political participation also emerged. Visiting EU students discussed different forms of 
engagement, whilst home students evaluated different levels of politics. Most visiting EU 
students questioned the impact citizens could have on political decision-making and, 
consequently, they preferred participating in alternative forms of engagement, especially in 
volunteering and protesting. They felt that in this way “you make a little bit of impact”. In 
comparison, a good number of home students recognised local- rather than EU- or national-
level of politics as the key to “making a difference”. Hence nearly all had voted in Swedish 
local elections. 
 
 There was some similarity in the general approaches of visiting EU and home 
students to EU politics. Even though almost every student agreed that the EU was “extremely 
important”, they did not believe citizens had “any real influence” over EU politics. They also 
described the EU as “too abstract” and “complicated to really understand”. Thus only two 
visiting EU students had ever voted in the EP elections, and a couple had volunteered at the 
EU-level through, for instance, the European Voluntary Service. In comparison, none of the 
Swedish students had participated in the EP elections and only one had worked as an intern at 
the EP. Interestingly, home students seemed more critical about their abstention from EU 
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politics and actively encouraged each other to participate in future EP elections. Nevertheless, 
their approaches accentuated the second-order character of EU citizenship. 
Swedish Female (4), Control Group: [You] don't have to know so much to vote in the 
European Union, because you can choose to vote [for] the socialists, the conservatives or 
if you choose the extreme, vote for the Greens. You can choose your political ideology 
and vote for that, then hopefully things will turn out fine. …I do not think we should take 
it as seriously as some do because it's hard to get to know information about the 
European Union.  
 
 Visiting EU and home students also reached different conclusions about the 
consequences of their abstention from EU politics. For visiting EU students it strengthened 
two links: one between mobility and EU citizenship, and another between political 
participation and national citizenship. 
French Male, EU Group 4: This is kind of complicated to really understand what is our 
European right and what are our national rights … [and] that we should be very involved 
in the European political life, for example the European election. I think in every country 
this is less important than the national election… I think we just experience the fact of 
European citizenship when we go abroad, as we are now. 
In addition to these links, home students believed that their abstention from EU politics might 
explain their lack of EU identity. “I might not feel much like a European citizen because it 
doesn't feel like anything I will do will make a difference on [the] European-level” (Swedish 
Female (1) Control Group). This conclusion contradicts the originally value-based approach 
of home students to (EU) citizenship. 
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 There was also some disagreement among visiting EU students about where (in 
which country) they should participate, depending on the length of time they had spent in 
Sweden. Students with temporary residence claimed it was not “their place” to participate in 
Sweden and only ever participated in their country of origin. In comparison, students with 
semi-permanent Swedish residency had a tendency to participate there and actively supported 
the granting of national electoral rights to mobiles. 
German Female, EU Focus Group 2 [Full time student, lived in Sweden for 3,5 years]: 
[E]ven though we live outside of our home countries and some longer than others, we 
still vote in our national elections... But we don’t actually live in that country! ... [W]e 
don't participate in the policies that are taking place where we live that could actually 
benefit us.  
 
 Therefore, the fleeting debate about political participation among students and, 
subsequently, the growing difference between visiting EU and home students’ approaches to 
this dimension suggest that the dichotomy of passive/active (EU) citizens is likely to be 
determined by mobility. This finding is substantiated further by the indication that the length 
of time spent abroad transformed students’ approaches to political participation. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
Globalisation is transforming the relationship between nation states and citizens, 
revising processes of differentiation and exclusion and these transformations are most evident 
in Europe (Beck 2006). Against this backdrop, the article provided an in-depth qualitative 
interrogation of processes of differentiation and exclusion, using original focus group 
evidence. The empirical findings indicated that all three dimensions of EU citizenship tend to 
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be more relevant to the lives of visiting EU than home students, confirming the expected 
differences between mobiles and stayers. For instance, the evidence suggests that visiting EU 
students were more likely to realise a direct, civic from of EU citizenship, while home 
students observed it as a secondary link – an extension of their (cultural) national citizenship. 
These findings highlight the usefulness of analysing citizens’ identity along the civic/cultural 
divide (Bruter 2005). 
 
 A closer inspection of the dimensions of EU citizenship made a compelling case for 
approaching the dichotomy of passive/active citizens along the stayers/mobiles distinction. 
First, students exhibited kaleidoscopic and context-contingent identities (Ross 2014), and 
their identity was reconfigured by experiences of migration and mobility. The majority of 
students found migration fruitful to developing a sense of belonging to the EU and excluding 
the “other”. However on the basis of their mobility status, visiting EU and home students 
classified each other as ‘internal (EU) others’. Second, most students recognised that mobility 
was the key right of EU citizenship. They then described the way in which increased mobility 
within the EU has led to further differentiation between and among stayers and mobiles. 
Third, the marginal significance of political participation to students’ experiences of EU 
citizenship was underscored by their short-lived debate about this issue. The subsequent 
distinction between visiting EU and home students’ approaches to participation highlighted 
that, in their eyes, national citizenship and participation, and EU citizenship and mobility are 
concurrent. These findings indicate that applying the traditional dichotomy of passive/active 
citizens from a political engagement perspective is not likely to help us make sense of the 
different categories of EU citizens. Instead, we should begin to explore this dichotomy along 
the stayers/mobiles distinction. 
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The overall findings of this article also emphasise that applying the concept of 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) in the cosmopolitan context may be particularly useful to 
exploring emerging processes of differentiation and exclusion in the EU. The evidence 
suggests that, for passive citizens (in this case ‘stayers’) EU citizenship has a second-order 
status and flows from their existing national citizenships. For active citizens (in this case 
‘mobiles’) EU citizenship is chiefly connected to their mobility experiences. Further sub-
categories within both active and passive EU citizens have also emerged, supplementing the 
debate about different types of (cosmopolitan) movers and stayers (Skey 2011a, 2013). On 
the one hand, passive EU citizens’ perceptions and behaviour are likely to be mediated by 
their socio-economic background. This means that, as expected, poor member state nationals 
cannot be EU citizens in practice. Hence there are two sub-categories of passive EU citizens: 
potential EU citizens, with the necessary resources to move within the EU at some point, and 
member state-oriented citizens, who cannot turn their EU status into reality. On the other 
hand, active EU citizens’ perceptions and behaviour are likely to be mediated by their 
country of origin. The relevance of the EU is the most evident for EU-15 mobile citizens – 
the EU’s Eurostars (Favell 2008). They have a sense of shared EU identity and enjoy their 
EU rights to the fullest. In comparison, CEE mobile citizens are second-class Eurostars. 
Whereas they enjoy some EU citizenship rights owing to their mobility status, their economic 
rights and EU identity are restricted by member state policies and national prejudices. This 
was evident especially in CEE students’ approaches to the EU and their EU-15 counterparts, 
which accentuated the idiosyncratic character of EU citizenship. Table 2 illustrates the 
different categories of EU citizens. 
 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
Table 2: Categories of EU citizens 
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 The focus group evidence reported in this article provides original insights into 
and enhances our understanding of current processes of differentiation and exclusion. The 
findings underscore the emerging distinctions between the perceptions and behaviour of 
stayers and mobiles as passive/active (EU) citizens. These processes and the new dichotomy 
of passive/active citizens require more investigation, in particular against the backdrop of 
intensified global mobility flows and the presumed cosmopolitan outlook of (Western) 
travellers. The four categories of EU citizens identified in Table 2 are indicative of the way in 
which citizens are differentiated within the EU at present. Research into whether these or 
similar categories of citizens can be generalised across the EU’s member states and, if so, 
how these differences could be minimalised by policy-makers are potential area for future 
research.   
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i
 Globalisation is understood as a qualitative process, composed of a number of elements, including 
polarisation of wealth, subordination of politics to economics, related decline of the state and 
emergence of a new global division of labour (Talani 2010). 
ii
 For the purpose of clarity, this article refers to visiting EU students as the intra-EU mobile/active 
citizens and home or Swedish students as the stayers/ passive citizens 
iii
 In the cosmopolitanism literature ‘the Other’ is understood as those cultures and peoples that are 
different from the local or national contexts. Thus it is not to same as the “other” in the citizenship 
studies literature, which refers to non-citizens and (often) their cultures. 
iv
 All interviews were conducted in English. Hence students’ language skills had an impact on the 
flow and depth of discussions. 
